The right to do wrong : morality and the limits of law /

The law sometimes permits what ordinary morality, or widely-shared notions of right and wrong, reproaches. Rights to Do Grave Wrong explores the relationship between law and common morality to clarify law's reliance on society's broad presumption that people will exercise their rights resp...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Osiel, Mark
Format: Book
Language:English
Published: Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 2019
Subjects:
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!

MARC

LEADER 00000cam a2200000 i 4500
001 1041249832
003 OCoLC
005 20191125125544.0
008 180524t20192019mau b 001 0 eng c
010 |a 2018025427 
020 |a 9780674368255 
020 |a 0674368258 
040 |a MH/DLC  |b eng  |e rda  |c DLC  |d OCLCO  |d OCLCF  |d HLS  |d YDX  |d CLU  |d BDX  |d UCILW  |d UKMGB 
042 |a pcc 
049 |a VLAM 
050 0 0 |a K247.6  |b .O825 2019 
100 1 |a Osiel, Mark 
245 1 4 |a The right to do wrong :  |b morality and the limits of law /  |c Mark Osiel 
260 |a Cambridge, Massachusetts :  |b Harvard University Press,  |c 2019 
300 |a 502 pages ;  |c 25 cm 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references (429-489) and index 
505 0 |a Introduction : Defining the puzzle -- Common morality, social mores, and the law -- A sampling of rights to do wrong -- Three rights to do wrong -- How to "abuse" a right -- Law and morality in ordinary language and social science -- Divergences of law and morals : sites and sources -- Convergences of law and morals : sites and sources -- Questions of method and meaning : the law at odds with common morality -- Why this book is not what you had in mind -- The changing stance of lawyers towards common morality -- Commercial morality, bourgeois virtue, and the law -- How we attach responsibilities to rights -- Common morality confronts modernity 
520 |a The law sometimes permits what ordinary morality, or widely-shared notions of right and wrong, reproaches. Rights to Do Grave Wrong explores the relationship between law and common morality to clarify law's reliance on society's broad presumption that people will exercise their rights responsibly. More concretely, he argues that certain legal rights rest on tacit sociological assumptions as to who will exercise them, under what circumstances, and how frequently. Further, he argues that we depend on stigma and shame to reduce and circumscribe the law's use. Some examples: though reneging on a debt is considered wrong, the law allows you to declare personal bankruptcy; international law allows museums to retain some masterworks looted from their rightful owners; in many countries abortion is permitted as a means of birth control. Using these examples and more, Osiel presents a "social scientific" analysis of law's interaction with social mores and the extent to which they limit our exercising rights to do wrong. The paradox he intends to elucidate is when and why it is appropriate for societies to champion de jure entitlements even as they successfully limit their de facto usage.--  |c Provided by publisher 
650 0 |a Law and ethics 
907 |a .b2424265 
998 |a lower 
999 |c 116055 
852 |a Law Library  |b Lower Level  |h K247.6 .O825 2019  |p 33940004532410