Delegation in the regulatory state : independent regulatory agencies in Western Europe /
Working from data of transnational depth and breadth, the author concludes that policy makers delegate in order to tighten the credibility of policy commitments and to tie the hands of future ministers who may have different preferences
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA :
Edward Elgar,
©2008
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Table of contents |
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| LEADER | 00000cam a2200000 a 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | 173683745 | ||
| 003 | OCoLC | ||
| 005 | 20201029101742.0 | ||
| 008 | 071002s2008 enka b 001 0 eng | ||
| 010 | |a 2007040572 | ||
| 020 | |a 9781847204479 | ||
| 020 | |a 1847204473 | ||
| 020 | |a 9781848448124 | ||
| 020 | |a 1848448120 | ||
| 040 | |a DLC |b eng |c DLC |d BTCTA |d BAKER |d YDXCP |d BWKUK |d BWX |d UKM |d U5D |d GEBAY |d GBU |d OCLCQ |d OG# |d OCLCF |d OCLCQ |d CHVBK |d DEBBG |d OCLCQ |d OCLCO |d TKN |d UKMGB |d OCL |d OCLCA |d L2U |d OCLCO |d OCLCA | ||
| 043 | |a ew----- | ||
| 049 | |a VLAM | ||
| 050 | 0 | 0 | |a JF225 |b .G55 2008 |
| 100 | 1 | |a Gilardi, Fabrizio | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Delegation in the regulatory state : |b independent regulatory agencies in Western Europe / |c by Fabrizio Gilardi |
| 260 | |a Cheltenham, UK ; |a Northampton, MA : |b Edward Elgar, |c ©2008 | ||
| 300 | |a xii, 186 pages : |b illustrations ; |c 25 cm | ||
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 155-180) and index | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a Introduction -- The institutional foundations of the regulatory state -- Delegation to independent regulatory agencies : credibility, political uncertainty, and veto players -- The formal independence of regulators : empirical analysis -- Interdependent delegation : the diffusion of independent regulatory agencies -- The diffusion of independent regulatory agencies : empirical analysis -- Conclusion -- Appendices | |
| 520 | 8 | |a Working from data of transnational depth and breadth, the author concludes that policy makers delegate in order to tighten the credibility of policy commitments and to tie the hands of future ministers who may have different preferences | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Delegation of powers |z Europe, Western | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Administrative agencies |z Europe, Western |x Decision making | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Public administration |z Europe, Western |x Decision making | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Online version: |a Gilardi, Fabrizio. |t Delegation in the regulatory state. |d Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA : Edward Elgar, ©2008 |w (OCoLC)608554920 |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |3 Table of contents |u http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip081/2007040572.html |
| 907 | |a .b2445013 | ||
| 998 | |a lower | ||
| 999 | |c 118488 | ||
| 852 | |a Law Library |b Lower Level |h JF225 .G55 2008 |p 33940004585178 | ||