Delegation in the regulatory state : independent regulatory agencies in Western Europe /

Delegation in the regulatory state : independent regulatory agencies in Western Europe /

Working from data of transnational depth and breadth, the author concludes that policy makers delegate in order to tighten the credibility of policy commitments and to tie the hands of future ministers who may have different preferences

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Gilardi, Fabrizio
Format: Book
Language:English
Published: Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA : Edward Elgar, ©2008
Subjects:
Delegation of powers > Europe, Western
Administrative agencies > Europe, Western > Decision making
Public administration > Europe, Western > Decision making
Online Access:Table of contents
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Table of Contents:
  • Introduction
  • The institutional foundations of the regulatory state
  • Delegation to independent regulatory agencies : credibility, political uncertainty, and veto players
  • The formal independence of regulators : empirical analysis
  • Interdependent delegation : the diffusion of independent regulatory agencies
  • The diffusion of independent regulatory agencies : empirical analysis
  • Conclusion
  • Appendices

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