The functions of law /
This book seeks to contribute to a legal positivist picture of law by defending two metaphysical claims about law and investigating their methodological implications. One claim is that the law is a kind of artifact, a thoroughgoing human creation for performing certain tasks or accomplishing certain...
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Main Author: | |
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Format: | Book |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Oxford, United Kingdom :
Oxford University Press,
2016
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Edition: | First edition |
Subjects: | |
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LEADER | 00000cam a2200000 i 4500 | ||
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001 | 920736224 | ||
003 | OCoLC | ||
005 | 20190408043215.0 | ||
008 | 160113t20162016enk b 001 0 eng d | ||
010 | |a 2016930708 | ||
020 | |a 0199677476 | ||
020 | |a 9780199677474 | ||
040 | |a YDXCP |b eng |e rda |c DLC |d YDXCP |d BTCTA |d BDX |d CDX |d NLE |d EMI |d GXR |d OCLCF |d COO |d CHVBK |d UCL |d OCLCQ |d UX0 |d UKMGB | ||
042 | |a lccopycat | ||
049 | |a VLAM | ||
050 | 0 | 0 | |a K237 |b .E347 2016 |
100 | 1 | |a Ehrenberg, Kenneth M. | |
245 | 1 | 4 | |a The functions of law / |c Kenneth M. Ehrenberg |
250 | |a First edition | ||
260 | |a Oxford, United Kingdom : |b Oxford University Press, |c 2016 | ||
300 | |a x, 217 pages ; |c 24 cm | ||
504 | |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 199-209) and index | ||
505 | 0 | |a Introduction -- Concepts, distinctions, and some preliminary remarks on method -- Dworkin : justifying force and the right answer -- Natural law -- Legal positivism as a functional explanation of law -- Metaphysics then method -- Institutions, artifacts, and legal norms -- The functions themselves -- Conclusion | |
520 | |a This book seeks to contribute to a legal positivist picture of law by defending two metaphysical claims about law and investigating their methodological implications. One claim is that the law is a kind of artifact, a thoroughgoing human creation for performing certain tasks or accomplishing certain goals. That is, artifacts are generally understood in terms of their functions. When discussing artifacts, the notion of function need not be as mysterious or problematic as might be the case with biological functions. The other claim is that the law is an institution, a specific kind of artifact that creates artificial roles which allow for the establishment and manipulation of rights and duties among those subject to the institution. The methodological implication of this picture of law is that it is best understood in terms of the social functions that it performs and that the job of the legal philosopher is to investigate those functions. This position is advanced against non-positivist theories of law that nonetheless rely upon notions of law's function, and is also advanced against positivist pictures that tend to de-emphasize or overlook the central role that function must play to understand the nature of law. One key implication of this picture is that it can help explain how law might give people reasons to act beyond its use of force to do | ||
650 | 0 | |a Law |x Philosophy | |
907 | |a .b2291149 | ||
998 | |a lower | ||
999 | |c 123138 | ||
852 | |a Law Library |b Lower Level |h K237 .E347 2016 |p 33940004388003 |