Common law judging : subjectivity, impartiality, and the making of law /

Are judges supposed to be objective? Citizens, scholars, and legal professionals commonly assume that subjectivity and objectivity are opposites, with the corollary that subjectivity is a vice and objectivity is a virtue. These assumptions underlie passionate debates over adherence to original inten...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Edlin, Douglas E.
Format: Book
Language:English
Published: Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, [2016]
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001 938856152
003 OCoLC
005 20170107000000.0
008 160209s2016 miu b 001 0 eng
010 |a 2016006681 
020 |a 9780472130023 (hardcover : alk. paper) 
020 |a 0472130021 (hardcover : alk. paper) 
035 |a (SKY)279992299 
040 |a DLC  |b eng  |c DLC  |e rda  |d SKYRV 
042 |a pcc 
049 |a VLA 
050 0 0 |a K2146  |b .E335 2016 
100 1 |a Edlin, Douglas E., 
245 1 0 |a Common law judging :  |b subjectivity, impartiality, and the making of law /  |c Douglas E. Edlin 
260 |a Ann Arbor :  |b University of Michigan Press,  |c [2016] 
300 |a x, 262 pages ;  |c 24 cm 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 229-244) and indexes 
505 0 |a Introduction -- Subjectivity, objectivity, impartiality -- Subjectivity and intersubjectivity -- Making law -- Judicial individualism and judicial independence -- Conclusion 
520 |a Are judges supposed to be objective? Citizens, scholars, and legal professionals commonly assume that subjectivity and objectivity are opposites, with the corollary that subjectivity is a vice and objectivity is a virtue. These assumptions underlie passionate debates over adherence to original intent and judicial activism. In Common Law Judging, Douglas Edlin challenges these widely held assumptions by reorienting the entire discussion. Rather than analyze judging in terms of objectivity and truth, he argues that we should instead approach the role of a judge's individual perspective in terms of intersubjectivity and validity. Drawing upon Kantian aesthetic theory as well as case law, legal theory, and constitutional theory, Edlin develops a new conceptual framework for the respective roles of the individual judge and of the judiciary as an institution, as well as the relationship between them, as integral parts of the broader legal and political community. Specifically, Edlin situates a judge's subjective responses within a form of legal reasoning and reflective judgment that must be communicated to different audiences. Edlin concludes that the individual values and perspectives of judges are indispensable both to their judgments in specific cases and to the independence of the courts. According to the common law tradition, judicial subjectivity is a virtue, not a vice. Book jacket 
650 0 |a Judicial process  |z English-speaking countries 
650 0 |a Common law 
907 |a .b2294473 
998 |a secnd 
999 |c 123312 
852 |a Law Library  |b Second Floor  |h K2146 .E335 2016  |p 33940004391304