Regulating mergers and acquisitions of U.S. electric utilities : industry concentration and corporate complication /
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| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
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Cheltenham :
Edward Elgar Publishing,
2020
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Table of Contents:
- Diverse strategies, common purpose : selling public franchises for private gain
- Missing from utility merger markets : competitive discipline
- The structural result : concentration and complication no one intended
- - Suboptimal couplings cause economic waste
- Merging parties divert franchise value from the customers who created it
- Mergers can distort competition : market power, anticompetitive conduct and unearned advantage
- Hierarchical conflict harms customers
- Regulators unreadiness : checklists instead of visions
- Promoters' strategy : frame mergers as simple, positive, inevitable
- How do regulators respond? : by ceding leadership, underestimating negatives and accepting minor positives
- Explanations : passion gaps and mental shortcuts
- Regulatory posture and practice : less instinct, more analysis; less reactivity, more preparation
- Regulatory infrastructure : strengthen regulatory resources, clarify statutory powers, assess prior mergers' effects
- The U.S. electric industry : a tutorial