Antitrust law : economic theory and common law evolution /

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Hylton, Keith N
Format: Book
Language:English
Published: Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2003
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LEADER 00000cam a22000004a 4500
001 48767848
003 OCoLC
005 20050802120851.0
008 020107s2003 enka b 001 0 eng
010 |a 2002017406 
020 |a 052179031X (hardback) 
020 |a 0521793785 (pbk.) 
040 |a DLC  |c DLC  |d C#P  |d CKX  |d UKM 
042 |a pcc 
043 |a n-us--- 
049 |a VLAM 
050 0 0 |a KF1649  |b .H95 2003 
100 1 |a Hylton, Keith N 
245 1 0 |a Antitrust law :  |b economic theory and common law evolution /  |c Keith N. Hylton 
260 |a Cambridge, UK ;  |a New York :  |b Cambridge University Press,  |c 2003 
300 |a xvi, 413 p. :  |b ill. ;  |c 24 cm 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references and index 
505 0 |a Economics. Definitions ; Perfect competition versus monopoly ; Further topics -- Law and policy. Some interpretations issues ; Enacting the antitrust law ; What should antitrust law aim to do? -- Enforcement. Optimal enforcement theory ; Enforcement provision of the antitrust laws ; Appendix -- Cartels. Cartels ; Conscious parallelism ; Conclusion -- Development of Section 1 doctrine. The Sherman Act versus the common law ; Rule of reason and per-se rule ; Conclusion -- Rule of reason and per-se rule. The case for price-fixing ; Per-se and rule of reason analysis: further developments ; Per-se versus rule of reason tests: understanding the Supreme Court's justification for the per-se rule -- Agreement. The development of inference doctrine ; Rejection of unilateral contract theory -- Facilitating mechanisms. Data dissemination cases ; Basing point pricing and related practices ; Basing point pricing: economics -- Boycotts. Pre-Socony ; Post-Socony ; Post-BMI/Sylvania ; Conclusion -- Monopolization. Development of Section 2 doctrine ; Leveraging and essential facility cases ; Predatory pricing ; Conclusion -- Power. Measuring market power ; Determinants of market power ; Substitutability and the relevant market: cellophane ; Multi-market monopoly and the relevant market: Alcoa ; Measuring power: guidelines -- Attempts. The Swift formula and modern doctrine ; Dangerous probability requirement -- Vertical restraints. Resale price maintenance ; Vertical nonprice restraints ; Manufacturer retains title ; Agreement -- Tying and exclusive dealing. Introduction ; Early cases ; Development of the per-se rule ; Tension between rule of reason arguments and per-se rule ; Technological tying ; Exclusive dealing ; Appendix -- Horizontal Mergers. Reasons for merging and implications for law ; Horizontal merger law ; Conclusion ; Appendix -- Mergers, vertical and conglomerate. Vertical mergers ; Conglomerate mergers ; Concluding remarks -- Antitrust and the state. Noerr-Pennington doctrine ; Parker doctrine ; Some final comments: error costs and immunity doctrines 
650 0 |a Antitrust law  |z United States 
650 0 |a Antitrust law  |x Economic aspects 
907 |a .b1855670 
998 |a secnd 
999 |c 71568 
852 |a Law Library  |b Second Floor  |h KF1649 .H95 2003  |p 33940003058235