Antitrust law : economic theory and common law evolution /
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge, UK ; New York :
Cambridge University Press,
2003
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| Subjects: | |
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| LEADER | 03036cam a22003134a 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | 48767848 | ||
| 003 | OCoLC | ||
| 005 | 20050802120851.0 | ||
| 008 | 020107s2003 enka b 001 0 eng | ||
| 010 | |a 2002017406 | ||
| 020 | |a 052179031X (hardback) | ||
| 020 | |a 0521793785 (pbk.) | ||
| 040 | |a DLC |c DLC |d C#P |d CKX |d UKM | ||
| 042 | |a pcc | ||
| 043 | |a n-us--- | ||
| 049 | |a VLAM | ||
| 050 | 0 | 0 | |a KF1649 |b .H95 2003 |
| 100 | 1 | |a Hylton, Keith N | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Antitrust law : |b economic theory and common law evolution / |c Keith N. Hylton |
| 260 | |a Cambridge, UK ; |a New York : |b Cambridge University Press, |c 2003 | ||
| 300 | |a xvi, 413 p. : |b ill. ; |c 24 cm | ||
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a Economics. Definitions ; Perfect competition versus monopoly ; Further topics -- Law and policy. Some interpretations issues ; Enacting the antitrust law ; What should antitrust law aim to do? -- Enforcement. Optimal enforcement theory ; Enforcement provision of the antitrust laws ; Appendix -- Cartels. Cartels ; Conscious parallelism ; Conclusion -- Development of Section 1 doctrine. The Sherman Act versus the common law ; Rule of reason and per-se rule ; Conclusion -- Rule of reason and per-se rule. The case for price-fixing ; Per-se and rule of reason analysis: further developments ; Per-se versus rule of reason tests: understanding the Supreme Court's justification for the per-se rule -- Agreement. The development of inference doctrine ; Rejection of unilateral contract theory -- Facilitating mechanisms. Data dissemination cases ; Basing point pricing and related practices ; Basing point pricing: economics -- Boycotts. Pre-Socony ; Post-Socony ; Post-BMI/Sylvania ; Conclusion -- Monopolization. Development of Section 2 doctrine ; Leveraging and essential facility cases ; Predatory pricing ; Conclusion -- Power. Measuring market power ; Determinants of market power ; Substitutability and the relevant market: cellophane ; Multi-market monopoly and the relevant market: Alcoa ; Measuring power: guidelines -- Attempts. The Swift formula and modern doctrine ; Dangerous probability requirement -- Vertical restraints. Resale price maintenance ; Vertical nonprice restraints ; Manufacturer retains title ; Agreement -- Tying and exclusive dealing. Introduction ; Early cases ; Development of the per-se rule ; Tension between rule of reason arguments and per-se rule ; Technological tying ; Exclusive dealing ; Appendix -- Horizontal Mergers. Reasons for merging and implications for law ; Horizontal merger law ; Conclusion ; Appendix -- Mergers, vertical and conglomerate. Vertical mergers ; Conglomerate mergers ; Concluding remarks -- Antitrust and the state. Noerr-Pennington doctrine ; Parker doctrine ; Some final comments: error costs and immunity doctrines | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Antitrust law |z United States | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Antitrust law |x Economic aspects | |
| 907 | |a .b1855670 | ||
| 998 | |a secnd | ||
| 999 | |c 71568 | ||
| 852 | |a Law Library |b Second Floor |h KF1649 .H95 2003 |p 33940003058235 | ||